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This paper investigates catering as a motivation for substitution between share 
repurchases and dividend payments. I hypothesize that firms cater to investor demand 
by repurchasing shares when investors place a premium on the stock price of firms 
that repurchase shares, and by paying dividends when investors place a higher value 
on dividend-paying firms. I propose a proxy to measure the relative preference for 
repurchases over dividends—the difference premium. Results show that the decision 
to repurchase shares or to pay dividends depends on this premium. Firms channel 
higher fractions of the additional payout dollars toward share repurchases when this 
premium is high. The market reaction to dividend changes is more favorable when 
firms act in accordance with the catering hypothesis. Overall, I find that catering 
plays a role in the substitution between repurchases and dividends.  
JEL classification: G35 






Miller and Modigliani (1961) demonstrated that in a world with perfectly efficient 
and frictionless capital markets, payout policy is irrelevant. In such a world, rational 
investors do not have any preference for dividends over capital gains. However, 
subsequent literature has suggested that factors such as taxes, institutional ownership 
constraints, transaction costs, and the time horizons of investors might affect investor 
preferences (e.g., Allen et al., 2000; Black and Scholes, 1974; Graham and Kumar, 
2006). Baker and Wurgler (2004a) relax the assumption of perfectly efficient capital 
markets in the Miller and Modigliani model to propose a catering theory of dividends. 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) find that the managerial decision to pay 
dividends is driven by investor demand for dividend-paying firms. When investors value 
dividends, they assign a higher valuation to firms that pay dividends. Managers see this 
valuation difference and initiate dividends to capture the “premium.”   Baker and Wurgler 
calculate their main proxy, the value-weighted dividend premium, as the difference in the 
logarithm of the value-weighted market-to-book ratio (M/B) of dividend payers and non-
payers. Li and Lie (2005) extend the Baker and Wurgler study to show that dividend 
catering works not only for initiation of dividends, but also for increases and decreases in 
the level of dividend payments. Li and Lie also find that the capital markets reward 
managers for paying attention to the investor demand for dividends. A different line of 
literature documents the changing nature of firms that pay dividends (e.g., Fama and 
French, 2001) and the increasing importance of repurchases in corporate payout policy 
(e.g., Skinner, 2008). Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that US firms finance their 
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share repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends. 
The authors offer the tax-advantaged status of repurchases and a rule change
1
 by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as reasons contributing to the substitution of 
dividend payments with share repurchases. Brown et al. (2007) find evidence supporting 
a move from repurchases to dividends, specifically in response to a change in tax rates in 
2003. I propose catering as a motivation for the observed substitution. 
In this paper, I present a catering view of the payout decision. I posit that the 
choice between repurchases and dividends is a rational managerial response to changing 
valuations assigned to firms that repurchase shares versus those that pay dividends. Some 
investors, driven by their time-varying demands, may prefer to hold shares of firms that 
are repurchasing shares over those that are paying dividends. This demand drives apart 
the valuations of firms that follow different payout methods, within the limits of 
arbitrage. Managers rationally cater to this investor demand by repurchasing shares 
(paying dividends) when investors assign higher valuation to repurchasing (dividend-
paying) firms. Baker and Wurgler (2004a) present a catering theory of dividends using 
similar arguments. They, however, do not discuss share repurchases. I extend the Baker 
and Wurgler dividend catering theory to share repurchases, while considering the demand 
for repurchasing and dividend-paying firms together. 
                                                 
1
  The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b–18 provides a voluntary “safe harbor” 
from liability for manipulation under Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act), and Rule 10b–5 under the Exchange Act, when an issuer or its affiliated purchaser bids for 
or purchases shares of the issuer's common stock in accordance with the Rule 10b–18's manner, timing, 
price, and volume conditions. These conditions are: (1) on any one day, firms may not purchase more than 
25% of the average daily volume of their own shares during the prior four weeks; (2) firms may not 
purchase their own shares at the opening and closing one–half hours of trading; (3) firms may not purchase 
their own shares at a price higher than the last independent bid, or the last reported sale price; and (4) all 
purchases on a single day must be executed through the same brokerage firm. This rule was adopted in 
November 1982 and caused an increase in the number of open market repurchase programs adopted (see 
Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Ikenberry et al., 1995; etc.). 
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Researchers have documented evidence of catering in other corporate decisions. 
For example, Baker et al. (2009) show evidence of catering in nominal share prices; 
Aghion and Stein (2008) find that managers choose between sales growth and profit 
margins; and Polk and Sapienza (2009) show that mispricing can be driven by levels of 
investment. To test the catering hypothesis in payout policy, I first calculate the yearly 
M/B of firms for each year in the period 1971–2010. I then find the yearly difference in 
the logarithm of the value-weighted M/B of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. I 
use this measure as a proxy for the excess valuation that the market assigns to firms that 
repurchase shares, i.e., the “repurchase premium.”2 This proxy is constructed to give a 
measure comparable to the Baker and Wurgler (2004a) (value-weighted) dividend 
premium. To capture the relative preference for repurchases over dividends, I define the 
“difference premium” as the difference between my repurchase premium and the Baker 
and Wurgler dividend premium. Intuition suggests that firms will find repurchasing 
shares more attractive, relative to paying dividends, when this difference premium is 
positive. 
I consider the variation in the difference premium proxy over time. Using logit 
analysis, I find that firms are more likely to repurchase shares (pay dividends) when the 
difference premium is positive (negative). Hence, the decision to pay dividends or to 
repurchase shares is based on the relative values of the dividend and the repurchase 
premium. This finding supports Grullon and Michaely’s (2002) substitution hypothesis. If 
catering explains the observed substitution between repurchases and dividends, then 
                                                 
2
  Contrary to some previous mentions in the literature (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005), the term “repurchase 





managers must consider both premiums and decide to substitute one form of payout for 
the other based on the relative magnitudes of the two premiums. My results hold after 
controlling for taxes, the 1982 SEC rule change, risk measures (Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009), unobserved firm fixed effects, and other usual firm proxies (e.g., size, capital 
structure, cash holdings, etc.). 
My paper makes several additional contributions to the literature. First, I find that 
the difference premium explains the residual “propensity to repurchase” after accounting 
for time-varying firm characteristics, including investment opportunities, profitability, 
and firm size, using the Fama and French (2001) methodology. The Baker and Wurgler 
dividend premium cannot account for this repurchasing decision after controlling for risk 
characteristics (as explained in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)
3
), but the difference premium 
can. 
Second, I find that the repurchase premium is negatively correlated with the 
Baker and Wurgler dividend premium (correlation coefficient of -0.124), reflecting the 
competing attractiveness of repurchases and dividends. The dividend premium alone, in 
the presence of control variables for risk, cannot capture the attractiveness of repurchases 
to dividend payers. This relative attractiveness ties together the dividend and the 
repurchase premiums and highlights that the dividend premium by itself cannot entirely 
explain share-repurchasing activity. 
Third, I find that firms switch from paying dividends to repurchasing shares when 
the difference premium is positive. I use the Lintner (1956) dividend model to predict the 
                                                 
3
  Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) observe that measures of idiosyncratic and systematic risk are key 
determinants in the “propensity to pay dividends.” They show that the catering explanation of dividend 
payment loses explanatory power when they control for firm-level risk. However, my results in favor of 
catering-based substitution between repurchases and dividends hold after controlling for the Hoberg and 
Prabhala risk variables. 
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expected dividend behaviors of firms that repurchase shares and pay dividends, and find a 
negative relation between dividend forecast errors and the difference premium. In other 
words, firms pay less than the expected dividend when the repurchase premium is higher 
than the dividend premium. I also look at changes in total payout and investigate how 
additional payout dollars are distributed between share repurchases and dividend 
payments. I find that firms are more likely to channel any increases in total payout toward 
share repurchases when the difference premium is positive, in line with catering-based 
substitution. I also look at the investor reaction to announcements of dividend changes 
and investigate if this reaction is driven by catering. I find that investors react more 
favorably to announcements of a dividend increase by non-repurchasing firms when 
firms act in accordance with the predictions of the catering hypothesis. Conversely, when 
the changes in the difference premium predict that firms should decrease dividends and 
repurchase shares, and firms follow suit, investors greet these announcements less 
unfavorably. All of these results confirm that catering plays a role in substitution between 
dividends and share repurchases. 
This is one of the first papers to suggest catering as a potential explanation for the 
substitution effect found by numerous studies (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and 
Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008). The extant literature does not explore how preferences 
for dividend payments and share repurchases correlate through time and how these 
correlations relate to firms’ payout policies. My paper addresses these questions. Even 
though dividends and repurchases are competing methods of paying shareholders, the 
idea of catering based on the relative magnitude of dividend and repurchase premiums is 
unique to this paper. The results in this paper also shed light on a possible reason why 
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firms may announce repurchases in clusters. If the catering view holds, more managers 
are likely to buy back shares when the repurchase premium is higher than the dividend 
premium, thereby leading to clustering. These results might also explain the cyclical 
nature of repurchases. Because the investor demand for shares of repurchasing firms 
varies, the valuations assigned to firms that repurchase shares also changes. Managers 
react to this varying demand by changing the supply (affecting the rate of initiations and 
continuations of repurchases). 
In a contemporaneous study, Jiang et al. (2012) also investigate how the catering 
theory applies to share repurchases. They calculate a repurchase premium proxy based on 
frequent and infrequent repurchasers and find that firms are more likely to initiate and 
continue share repurchases when the repurchase premium is high. The authors also find 
that the fraction of shares repurchased by firms is positively related to the repurchase 
premium. Their evidence also supports the hypothesis that catering plays a role in the 
observed substitution between share repurchases and dividend payments. While Jiang et 
al. control for the Baker and Wurgler dividend premium in their tests, they do not 
consider the difference between the repurchase and the dividend premiums. The 
difference premium allows me to see how the relative attractiveness of the two premiums 
affects two competing methods of paying shareholders, namely share repurchases and 
dividend payouts. I also investigate how the difference premium affects the distribution 
of additional payout dollars between share repurchases and dividend payments, the 
deviations from the “expected” dividend payment behavior based on the Lintner (1956) 
model, and the abnormal announcement returns surrounding dividend increases and cuts. 
Overall, my paper focuses on investigating the catering-based substitution and the 
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importance of the relative magnitudes of the repurchase and the dividend premium while 
Jiang et al. confirm more initiation and continuation of repurchases when their repurchase 
premium is high.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the main 
assumptions and intuitive framework for repurchase catering and catering-based 
substitution. Section 3 explains the data and results of empirical tests. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Payout Catering 
 
I develop an intuitive framework to analyze the payout decision of firms, along 
the lines of Baker and Wurgler (2004a). When deciding on their payout policies, 
managers consider many variables such as investment opportunities, cash holdings, 
capital structure, agency issues, and signaling implications (e.g., Allen and Michaely, 
2003; Brav et al., 2005). Managers face the choice between repurchasing shares and 
paying dividends, the two most frequently used ways of paying back to shareholders 
(Allen and Michaely, 2003). In the Miller and Modigliani (1961) perfect capital markets 
world, this choice has a zero value consequence. 
Assume that there are two broad types of investors in this world, category 
investors and arbitrageurs. Category investors prefer firms that payout to shareholders. 
These investors are divided into two subcategories: those that repurchase shares and those 
that pay dividends. In the spirit of Rosch (1978) and Barberis and Shleifer (2003), 
category investors put firms that repurchase shares and those that pay dividends into 
separate investment categories. Possible reasons for this categorization are tax clienteles 
(similar to Black and Scholes, 1974 and Allen et al., 2000), time horizon of investments 
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(Graham and Kumar, 2006), the perception that repurchases signal undervaluation 
(Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Vermaelen, 1981), high 
expected future returns (Massa et al., 2007; Vermaelen, 1981), and even a popular belief 
that share repurchases are a shareholder-friendly activity (Sanders and Carpenter, 2003; 
Westphal and Zajac, 2001).  
This category-based demand may lead to an irrational expectation about the value 
of the firm. For example, category investors may categorize because they view non-
repurchasers (or non-dividend payers) as high-growth firms and might judge the future 
prospects of repurchasers (dividend payers) relative to their current assessment of growth 
opportunities. Similar cases can be made for other motivations behind categorization. 
Category investors assign different valuations to the firm: V
R 
if the firm repurchases 
shares, and V
NR





 to firms that pay dividends and those that do not, respectively. They 









 do in Baker 
and Wurgler (2004a). 
Arbitragers, in comparison, have rational expectations and know the long-run cost 
of repurchasing shares and paying dividends. The level of risk aversion among 
arbitrageurs and category investors might define the limits of arbitrage. With limited 
arbitrage, the perceptions of category investors cause the relative prices of share 
repurchasers and dividend payers to differ. In the presence of such pricing differences, 
managers cater to investor demand (of category investors) by paying out when they think 
that the net gain to catering is positive. 
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When deciding the method of payout, managers look at the premiums (i.e., 
valuation differences between the different categories) to maximize the firm value. If the 
observed difference between the repurchase premium and the dividend premium is 
positive, managers will channel the payout dollars to repurchases. Conversely, if the 
difference premium is negative, managers pay through dividends. This framework 
provides the basic intuitive argument for catering-based substitution.  
Empirically, this catering hypothesis posits that firms will buy back shares when 
investor demand for firms that are repurchasing shares is high. More specifically, 
repurchases (dividends) are positively (negatively) related to the lagged values of the 
difference premium. 
I realize that repurchases and dividends are not perfect substitutes. Dividends tend 
to be sticky (e.g., Allen et al., 2000; Fama and French, 2002), so it is unreasonable to 
expect that all dividend-paying firms will cut their payout to zero and start repurchasing 
simply because the difference premium is positive. Thus, my catering hypothesis posits 
that firms tune their payout policies to the trends of the difference premium and that the 
threshold premium for a firm to change its payout policy may differ based on firm 
characteristics. Some firms, possibly smaller firms without a long history of dividends, 
might start repurchasing shares when the magnitude of the difference premium is low, but 
that threshold for a larger firm with a long history of dividends could be higher. 
 Many studies have considered a “clientele effect” or “catering” as a motivation 
for many corporate decisions (e.g., Aghion and Stein, 2008; Baker et al., 2009; Polk and 
Sapienza, 2009). Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggest that dividend clienteles may form 
based on investor characteristics. Firms that pay higher (lower) dividends might attract 
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investors who prefer (dislike) dividend income because of marginal tax rates, age, or 
income concerns. Graham and Kumar (2006) analyze investor holdings and find that 
some older investors strongly prefer dividend-paying firms. Shefrin and Statman (1984) 
argue that “mental accounting” might influence preferences, whereby investors code for 
gains and losses across investments using prospect theory functions. Shefrin and Thaler 
(1988) and Thaler and Shefrin (1981) find that regret aversion, self-control problems, and 
life cycle preferences might also influence investors’ preferences for dividends. While 
clienteles for dividends have been extensively studied (e.g., Allen et al., 2000; Black and 
Scholes, 1974), clientele effects driving repurchase decisions have not. Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) develop a catering theory of dividends, but they do not consider 
“repurchase catering,” or how dividend catering and repurchase catering might be related. 
This paper builds on the Baker and Wurgler dividend premium. Because it is 
quantifiable, I can use it to study the relative attractiveness of dividends and share 
repurchases, after developing corresponding measures of the repurchase premium. 
3. Data and Empirical Tests 
 
3.1 Repurchase premium variables 
Firm-level data for this study are gathered from the Compustat database. The 
sample period is 1971–2010. To be included in my sample for calculating the premiums, 
the firm must have the following data in year t (Compustat variable names in 
parentheses): total assets (AT), stock price (PRCC_F) and shares outstanding (CSHO), 
income before extraordinary items (IB), interest expense (XINT) [cash] dividends per 
share by the ex-date (DVPSX_F), preferred dividends (DVP), and (a) preferred stock 
liquidating value (PSTKL), (b) preferred stock redemption value (PSTKRV), or (c) 
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preferred stock carrying value (PSTK). Firms must also have stockholder equity (SEQ), 
liabilities (LT), or common equity (CEQ); share price at calendar year end (PRCC_C); 
and preferred stock par value (PSTK). Following Fama and French (2001), I exclude 
firms with book equity below $250,000 or assets below $500,000. I also require that the 
amount spent on the purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) be reported. In 
calculating the total repurchase amount for a firm-year observation, this data item 
(PRSTKC) is adjusted by decreases in the preferred stock redemption value (PSTKRV) 
from the year before. As discussed in Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Dittmar (2000), 
this adjustment takes care of the conversion of preferred stock into common stock, the 
retirement of preferred stock, and the retirement or redemption of redeemable preferred 
stock. If the repurchase amount, after this adjustment, is positive and at least 1% of the 
market value of equity, then I consider the firm a repurchaser for the year (otherwise the 
firm is a non-repurchaser). If a firm has positive dividends per share by ex-date, it is 
identified as a dividend payer. I exclude utilities and financial firms (Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes 4900–4949 and 6000–6999) from the sample. 
Repurchase Premium is the difference in the logarithm of the M/B weighted by 
the book-value of assets of firms that are classified as repurchasers and non-repurchasers 
in a year. M/B is constructed following Fama and French (2001). Dividend Premium is 
the value-weighted dividend premium from Baker and Wurgler (2004a). I use data from 
their study through year 2000, and use their methodology to construct this variable for the 
remainder of the time series. The difference between the repurchase premium and the 
dividend premium is the Difference Premium. Table 1 shows the values of the payout 
premiums, and Figure 1 shows these premiums by year. 
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Compustat started reporting data on repurchases in 1971. In late 1982, the SEC 
adopted Rule 10b-18, which had a major impact on repurchase activity (see Grullon and 
Michaely, 2002 and footnote 1). In 1983, the difference premium rose moderately. The 
difference between the repurchase and the dividend premiums is close to zero after 1986. 
This matches the expected outcome of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which reduced the 
difference between the capital gains and income tax rates.
4
  The difference premium 
favors repurchases throughout the early 1990s and falls at the end of 1997. The high 
difference in premiums for most of the 1990s matches well with the reported rise in 
repurchases during that time (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2002). A drop in the repurchase 
premium around 2003 likely stems from the Bush tax cuts,
5
 which made repurchasing 
shares less favorable.
6
  At the onset of the recent financial crisis in 2007, the difference 
premium drops below zero. Figure 1 captures some key historic changes that potentially 
affected the substitution decision of US firms. 
Note that a difference premium of 10% does not imply that a firm that stops 
dividend payouts and initiates share repurchases will see a 10% jump in its share price. 
Firms that follow different payout policies might differ on a number of characteristics, 
                                                 
4
  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the top tax rate from 50% to 28%, while the bottom rate was raised 
from 11% to 15%—the first time in the history of the U.S. income tax that the top rate was reduced and the 
bottom rate was increased concomitantly. In addition, capital gains faced the same tax rate as ordinary 
income.  
5
  The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) accelerated the gradual rate 
reduction and increase in credits passed in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001 (EGTRRA). The maximum tax rate decreases originally scheduled to be phased into effect in 2006 
under EGTRRA were retroactively enacted to apply to the 2003 tax year. JGTRRA increased both the 
percentage rate at which items can be depreciated and the amount a taxpayer may choose to expense. In 
addition, the capital gains tax decreased from rates of 8%, 10%, and 20% to 5% and 15%. 
6
  My data show a drop in the value weighted dividend premium in 2003. When I construct the equally-
weighted dividend premium measure, following Baker and Wurgler (2004a), I do not observe this drop. 
This leads me to believe that firms with high book-value of assets and low M/B joined the group of 
dividend payers in the wake of JGTRAA, creating this anomaly. See Brown et al. (2007) for a discussion 
on how incentives, including managerial ownership, played a role in the dividend payment decision of 
firms around that time. 
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such as size, maturity, and profitability, which the difference-in-premiums approach does 
not capture. These firm characteristics, unlike the decision to repurchase shares or pay 
out dividends, may not be under managerial control. When used here as a proxy, M/B is 
meant to capture valuation, and the difference premium is meant to capture relative 
valuation between repurchasers and dividend payers. However, M/B is also used in the 
literature as a proxy for growth options (e.g., Denis and Osobov, 2005). As such, a 
disadvantage of this proxy is that it captures growth options of repurchasers relative to 
dividend payers; therefore, I control for firm-level M/B in pertinent regression. 
I create several variables to control for known effects on payout policy decisions 
(e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Hovakimian et al., 2001; 
Jagannathan et al., 2000; Kahle (2002). When used in regressions as control variables, all 
independent variables are calculated with a lag of one fiscal year (and represented with a 
subscript of t-1 in the tables). When used to control for effects in the same time period, 
contemporaneous variables are used (and represented with a subscript of t in the tables). 
LnAssets is the logarithm of total assets. Debt is defined as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled 
by the book-value of assets. Cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents (CHE) scaled 
by the book-value of assets. ROA is the return on assets, defined as the operating income 
(OIBDP) scaled by the book-value of assets. Std. Dev. ROA is the standard deviation of 
the ROA, calculated over the last three years. Tax is the difference between the highest 
prevalent rate in income tax over capital gains tax. FCF is the free cash flow, defined as 
the gross operating income (OIBDP) minus the sum of depreciation (DP), tax payments 
(TXT), interest expenses (XINT), and dividends scaled by the book-value of assets. Std. 
Dev. FCF is the standard deviation of the FCF, calculated over the last three years. 
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Return is the return on the stock price of the firm over the current fiscal year. Non-
operating Income is the non-operating income before depreciation (NOPI) scaled by the 
book-value of assets. Repurchase Yield (Dividend Yield) is calculated by scaling the 
dollar amount of repurchases (dividends) by the market value of equity.  
I also create variables to control for risk, as suggested by Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009). NYP is the NYSE market capitalization percentile, i.e., the fraction of NYSE 
firms having equal or smaller capitalization. Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation 
of residuals from a regression of the firm’s daily excess stock returns on the market factor 
(i.e., the CRSP value-weighted market return less the riskfree rate). One firm-year value 
of idiosyncratic risk is computed using returns data from one calendar year. Systematic 
Risk is the standard deviation of the predicted value from the idiosyncratic risk 
calculation. 
3.2 Firm-level decision to repurchase shares or to pay dividends 
First, I investigate the firm-level decision to repurchase shares or to pay 
dividends. I test how the difference between the repurchase and the dividend premium 
affects the payout choice after controlling for firm characteristics. Table 2 shows the 
results of these tests. Specification 1 shows the result of a logit regression to model the 
decision to pay dividends using data on all sample firms between 1972 and 2010. The 
coefficient on the difference premium is negative and significant, suggesting that firms 
are more likely to pay dividends when the difference premium is negative (i.e., the 
dividend premium is greater than the repurchase premium). In specification 2, I run a 
similar logit regression on the decision to repurchase shares. The coefficient on the 
difference premium is positive and significant, suggesting that firms are more likely to 
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repurchase shares when the difference premium is positive (i.e., the repurchase premium 
is greater than the dividend premium). These results are similar to Jiang et al. (2012) who 
find that that firms are more (less) likely to repurchase shares when their repurchase (the 
Baker and Wurgler dividend) premium is high (low). 
Grullon and Michaely (2002), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), and others point 
out the importance of SEC Rule 10b-18 passed in 1982. Repurchases became more 
prevalent after this rule was enacted. To control for any biases resulting from this rule 
change, I run a regression (specification 3) to model the decision to repurchase shares 
using data from 1983 onwards. In specification 4, I run a similar regression for the period 
1971–2006, ending just before the onset of the financial crisis of 2007. The results remain 
unaffected by these time-period choices. Finally, to control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, I run a firm fixed-effects logit regression model (specification 5). The 
difference premium continues to be positively related to the decision to repurchase 
shares, ruling out any systematic unobserved firm-level variable driving these results.
7
  
The decision to repurchase shares or to pay dividends is affected by the difference 
premium, after controlling for tax rate differentials between income and capital gains, 
measures of firm-level risk, the 1982 SEC rule change regarding share repurchase 
guidelines, the recent US financial crisis, and other unobserved firm fixed effects. This 
shows strong support for the catering hypothesis, indicating that firms are more likely to 
                                                 
7
   When running a logit regression with firm fixed effects, if the dependent variable does not change for a 
firm during the sample period, all observations for that firm are dropped from the test. Hence, the number 
of observations drops from 85,678 in specification 2 to 54,678 in specification 5 of Table 2. The 54,678 
observations for this specification are for firms that paid dividends and repurchased shares at some time 
during the sample period. 
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I also perform robustness checks by repeating the logit regressions shown in 
specifications 1 and 2 of my Table 2 but replacing my difference premium proxy with the 
Jiang et al. (2012) value-weighted repurchase premium (not shown). I find a significant 
and negative (positive) coefficient on the Jiang et al. VW repurchase premium proxy 
when modeling the decision to pay dividends (repurchase shares). I get similar and 
statistically significant results when I replace the difference premium proxy with my 
repurchase premium proxy. When I create a proxy similar to that of Jiang et al., using 
repurchase classification over multiple years, I get results similar to the repurchase 
premium proxy used in this paper. These results further show that the Jiang et al. 
repurchase premium proxy and my repurchase premium proxy are related.
9
 Banyi et al. 
(2008) evaluate the accuracy of multiple share repurchase measures and conclude that the 
Compustat purchase of common stock, which I use, is a better measure for the actual 
number of shares repurchased by firms than the number of shares outstanding listed in the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, which Jiang et al. use. While 
doing their robustness checks, Jiang et al. also note that their results hold when they use 
Compustat-based purchase of common stock as a proxy for share repurchases. 
Taken together, these results show that the decision to pay dividends or to 
repurchase shares is related to the relative magnitude of the two premiums. Firms are 
                                                 
8
  In unreported results, I also run regressions on all specifications reported in Table 2 with variables to 
control for time trend and also with dummy variables to control for industry characteristics (using the 48 
industry dummies of Fama and French (1997) and two- and three-digit SIC codes). The results are strongly 
significant in all these cases. 
 
9
  In my sample period of 1971–2010, the Jiang et al. unadjusted value-weighted (VW) repurchase 
premium proxy and my repurchase premium proxy are significantly positively correlated (correlation 
coefficient of 0.688 with a p-value less than .001).  
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more likely to repurchase shares (pay dividends) when the difference premium is positive 
(negative). These results show that the Baker and Wurgler dividend premium should be 
considered relative to the repurchase premium when modeling the decision to repurchase 
shares or the decision to pay dividends. Prior literature (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; 
Skinner, 2008; etc.) has discussed firms substituting one form of payout with the other, 
but this is the first evidence hinting at competing clienteles driving payout decisions. My 
results show that the relative magnitudes of the two premiums affect the decision to 
repurchase shares or to pay dividends. 
3.3 Controlling for time-varying firm characteristics 
Fama and French (2001) find that three fundamentals—profitability, investment 
opportunities, and size—factor into the decision to pay dividends. In this section, I look 
at the possibility that the difference premium is related to the cross-sectional distribution 
of payout-relevant characteristics of dividend payers and share repurchasers. For 
example, suppose that earnings of repurchasing firms increase when the repurchase 
premium is higher than the dividend premium (i.e., the difference premium is positive). 
In such a situation, the probability to repurchase shares may be driven by the excess cash 
(realized from higher earnings) that repurchasers have and not by the difference 
premium. Specifically, I examine whether the difference premium helps to explain the 
residual variation in the repurchase decision after controlling directly for sample 
characteristics, particularly those found to be significant by Fama and French. I include 
the same variables when I model the repurchase behavior, captured in the following 
equation: 
             (1) 
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NYP is as defined previously. M/B is the market-to-book ratio as defined previously, 
with the slight modification that here I use the fiscal year-end stock price instead of the 
calendar year-end stock price. Growth in book assets (dA/A) is calculated as the change 
in asset size between year t-1 and t, scaled by assets. Profitability (E/A) is the earnings 
before extraordinary items (IB) plus interest expenses (XINT) plus income statement 
deferred taxes (TXDI) divided by the book-value of assets. 
This test is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, following Fama and French, 
I estimate a set of yearly Fama-MacBeth logit regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) 
from 1972 to 2010 on the decision to repurchase shares, controlling for firm 
characteristics. The yearly coefficients estimated as a result of the logit regression (and 
the values of the explanatory variables) are then used to estimate the expected probability 
of repurchasing shares for each firm. Then, I calculate the prediction errors (actual policy 
minus predicted policy) for each firm. The error term, u, shown in equation (1), thus 
captures the residual probability of repurchasing shares. I sum the residuals by year and 
calculate the average error by dividing the summed residual error by the number of firms 
in the sample for that year t. The averaged residual is the yearly “propensity to 
repurchase,” or PTR, after controlling for firm-level variation in size, growth options, and 
profitability. In the second stage, I see if this average annual residual is driven by the 
lagged value of the variable of interest, Pt-1: 
 ,   
                              (2) 
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The regression in equation (2) aims to explicitly remove the effect of time-varying 
characteristics, and the two-stage approach allows the difference premium to explain only 
the residual variation, after taking firm characteristics into account. 
First, I run the above described regressions for all sample firms using data from 
1972–2010. Panel A of Table 3 shows results for the second stage of the regression. 
Specification 1 shows the results when the lagged difference premium is regressed on the 
propensity to repurchase. The coefficient on the difference premium is positive and 
significant, indicating that the difference premium can explain the residual propensity to 
repurchase shares, after controlling for size, M/B, and profitability. Specification 2 shows 
the results when the propensity to repurchase is regressed on the lagged value of the 
Baker and Wurgler dividend premium variable. The coefficient on the dividend premium 
variable is negative, in line with the Grullon and Michaely (2002) substitution hypothesis, 
and the Baker and Wurgler (2004a) finding that the “propensity to pay dividends” is 
positively related to the dividend premium. 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) find that the Baker and Wurgler dividend premium 
cannot explain the propensity to pay dividends in the presence of measures controlling 
for the firm-level idiosyncratic and systematic risks. To see how the difference premium 
behaves in the presence of these risk measures, I change the first stage of the above 
described regression to include terms for idiosyncratic and systematic risks (in addition to 
the four variables originally used to capture size, growth options, and profitability), as 
described in Hoberg and Prabhala. Results (in specification 3) show that including these 
risk measures in the first stage of the regression does not change the sign or significance 
of the difference premium in the second-stage regression. However, in line with the 
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Hoberg and Prabhala finding, adding the risk measures in the first stage of the regression 
results in the dividend premium variable losing its significance in the second stage of the 
regression (see specification 4). This shows that the difference premium has explanatory 
power in predicting the probability of repurchasing shares after controlling for firm-level 
variation in size, growth options, profitability, and risk measures. The Hoberg and 
Prabhala risk variables soak up the significance of the dividend premium in explaining 
the decision to pay dividends, but the relative attractiveness of dividends over 
repurchases (captured by the difference premium variable) still has explanatory power in 
the decision to repurchase shares. This may be driven by the nature of the repurchase 
decision timing (decided after investment decisions, as suggested by the Brav et al. 
(2005) survey) or the inherent flexibility that share repurchases offer (compared with that 
of dividend payments, which tend to be “sticky”). 
After looking at the repurchasing decision of all firms in the sample, I model the 
repurchasing decision of dividend-paying firms. I restrict my sample (for the Fama-
MacBeth regressions) to only the dividend-paying firms. I use the method described 
earlier to calculate the probability that the dividend-paying firms repurchase shares, and 
then I calculate the residual propensity to repurchase shares. I then test if the lagged 
values of the difference premium can explain variations in the propensity to repurchase 
shares by dividend-paying firms. Panel B of Table 3 shows the corresponding results. 
The dividend-paying firms are more likely to repurchase shares when the lagged value of 
the difference premium is positive. Controlling for the Hoberg and Prabhala risk 
measures does not decrease the significance level of this result. Interestingly, the Baker 
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and Wurgler dividend premium does not significantly explain the repurchasing choice of 
dividend-paying firms. 
These results show that the difference premium can explain share repurchasing 
activity after controlling for the time-varying firm characteristics, including the Hoberg 
and Prabhala (2009) risk variables. The main results hold in the broad universe of 
Compustat firms and in a subsample of dividend-paying firms, demonstrating that the 
difference premium has explanatory power beyond that of the dividend premium alone. 
The difference premium captures the relative attractiveness of repurchases over 
dividends, while the dividend premium captures the attractiveness of dividends alone.
10, 11
 
3.4 Deviation from the expected dividend payout and the role of catering in 
substitution 
Next, I evaluate the evidence related to firm-level substitution of repurchases for 
dividends to determine if catering plays a role in this substitution. I use a modified 
Lintner (1956) analysis of how firms determine their dividend policy. In the spirit of 
Skinner (2008), I separate firms that have repurchased shares and paid dividends in at 
least half of the years in my sample period. Using my sample period of 1971–2010, I 
separate firms that exist for the entire period and have paid dividends and repurchased 
                                                 
10
  Because M/B is also sometimes used as a proxy for investment opportunities, Fama and French (2001) 
also estimate a model for the first-stage regression without M/B in the specification for the Fama-MacBeth 
logit regression. When I replicate that procedure (and drop M/B from equation 1 while estimating 
coefficients for the annual logit regressions), my results are unchanged. Also, for the sake of brevity, I 
show only results for the propensity to repurchase (PTR), but when I model the corresponding propensity to 
pay dividends, I get similar results. The coefficient on the lagged value of the dividend premium variable is 
positive (as expected from the competing nature of dividends and repurchases for the same payout dollars). 
The coefficient on the lagged value of the difference premium is negative and significant at the 10% level.  
11
  Results are robust to changing the specification in equation 1 to add variables for the one-year growth in 
sales (between year t-1 and t) of the firm, the logarithm of one plus the firm’s age in the CRSP database, 
the logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns (over the year t), and the current 
retained earnings (divided by assets), as in Grullon et al. (2011). When the “propensity to repurchase” 
calculated from the first stage regression with the above described control variables (in addition to the four 
Fama-French variables and the variables for systematic and idiosyncratic risk) is regressed on the lagged 
difference premium, the coefficient on the difference premium variable is positive and significant. 
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shares in at least 20 of these 40 years. This helps narrow my sample to a probable list of 
firms that are equally likely to pay dividends or repurchase shares. I do not require that a 
firm does both in the same year. I also do not impose any restrictions on when the payout 
occurred—in the early or the late part of the sample period—or whether they occurred in 
consecutive years or not. Using the Lintner model, I estimate the expected dividend 
payment for a firm based on its past dividend payment behavior. I then calculate 
deviations from the expected dividend payment by comparing the expected and the actual 
dividend payment of a firm. The deviation from the expected dividend payout is captured 
by the residual dividend error, defined as:    
                  (3) 
For a firm i, ΔDIVi,t is the actual change in dividends, and EARNi,t captures earnings in 
year t. MVi,t-1 is the market value of equity for firm i in year t-1. The  coefficients are 
estimated for each firm individually, using data from 1971–1990 (roughly half the sample 
period). These parameter estimates are then used to calculate the residual dividend error 
for the same firms during 1991–2010 (roughly the second half of the sample period).12 
This Error captures the difference between the actual and the predicted dividend change 
for a firm in a given year, scaled by the market value of equity. I regress this residual 
dividend error on firm characteristics to find out what causes firms to deviate from the 
expected dividend payout behavior. Following Grullon and Michaely (2002), I use debt, 
non-operating income, ROA, the repurchase yield, and the standard deviation of ROA as 
control variables. The substitution hypothesis predicts that if firms are substituting funds 
                                                 
12
  At the suggestion of the referee, I repeated the same test by gathering a sample of firms that exist only 
for the entire estimation period 1971–1990 (and may or may not be missing from the second half of the 
time period, i.e., 1991–2010). For this robustness check, I also drop any extreme residual dividend error 




to be used for dividends with repurchases, the residual dividend error will be negatively 
related to the repurchase yield. If catering plays a role in this substitution, the difference 
premium should be significant in explaining the residual dividend error. Table 4 shows 
these results. 
Results in specification 1 support the Grullon and Michaely (2002) substitution 
hypothesis. The negative and significant relation between the residual dividend error and 
the repurchase yield suggests that firms repurchase more shares when the actual dividend 
is lower than the expected dividend. The substitution result holds when the Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2009) risk variables are introduced in specification 2. The negative sign on the 
repurchase yield persists when I introduce the difference premium in specification 3. The 
coefficient on the difference premium is also negative and significant, showing that the 
actual dividend is lower than the predicted dividend when the difference premium is 
positive. This supports a catering-based substitution.  
Overall, this result supports the view that funds that were to be used to pay 
dividends are instead being used to repurchase shares when the difference premium is 
positive. Firms substitute repurchases for dividends in line with predictions of the 
catering hypothesis. The negative relation between the difference premium and the 
residual dividend error, similar to the negative relation between the repurchase yield and 
the residual dividend error, shows that catering plays a role in the previously documented 
(Grullon and Michaely, 2002) substitution. 
3.5 Distribution of net payout between share repurchases and dividend payments 
Recent evidence suggests that looking at total cash payout rather than any form of 
payout alone (e.g., Boudoukh et al., 2007; Grullon et al., 2011) might be more 
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appropriate. I next investigate how the difference premium affects the distribution of total 
payout between share repurchases and dividend payments. I calculate the Total Payout, 
the sum of dividends and share repurchases, for a firm as well as the changes in total 
payout compared to the previous year. Similarly, I also determine the changes in dividend 
payments and the changes in shares repurchases for a firm. I then calculate the fraction of 
the change in total payout that goes to incremental share buyback, defined as the change 
in share repurchase divided by the change in total payout. Intuitively, this ratio represents 
the fraction of an additional dollar of total payout used toward share repurchases. A 
positive fractional change in this measure results in an increase in share repurchases 
when the total payout increases. I investigate if the difference premium can explain how 
firms allocate additional payout dollars toward repurchases. Table 5 shows the results of 
these ordinary least squares (OLS) and tobit regressions. 
After controlling for size, M/B, change in ROA, risk measures, I find that the 
OLS regression coefficient on the lagged difference premium is positive and significant.
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This indicates that firms use a higher fraction of additional payout dollars toward 
repurchases when the difference premium is positive. Results are strong for the entire 
sample period and for the period after the 1982 SEC rule change (shown in specifications 
1 and 2, respectively). I also run a tobit regression to explain the fraction of the change in 
                                                 
13
  The negative coefficient on the Tax variable is a little puzzling in these regressions. Considering that the 
Tax variable is defined as the difference between capital gains and the ordinary income tax rates, the 
negative sign seems to indicate that firms channel additional payout toward repurchases when the rate of 
the ordinary income tax is higher than that of the capital gains tax. In unreported results, I find that this sign 
is sensitive to specific time periods. When the data for the OLS and tobit regressions is restricted to years 
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the sign on the Tax variable is positive and significant (and the sign on 
the Difference Premium variable remains positive and significant). Thus, the negative sign on the Tax 
variable appears to be driven by the higher-than-expected allocation of incremental payout dollars toward 
dividends between 1972 and 1986, in spite of the unfavorable tax treatment of dividends. Black (1976), and 
others, have talked specifically about this puzzling phenomenon of firms preferring to pay dividends in 
spite of tax disadvantages, and named it the “Dividend Puzzle.” 
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total payout that goes toward share repurchases. Results in specification 3 show that a 
higher fraction of the change in total payout is channeled toward share repurchases when 
the difference premium is positive.  
Jiang et al. (2012) look at the fraction of shares repurchased by firms and find 
results confirming the catering hypothesis. They find that firms repurchase more shares 
when the repurchase (dividend) premium is high (low). While my results provide insight 
into how the incremental payout dollars are divided between share repurchases and 
dividend payments, they find that the overall fraction of shares repurchased increases 
with the repurchase premium and decreases with the dividend premium. 
These results further show that catering plays a significant role in how firms 
decide to adjust the fraction of share repurchases in their overall payout policies. A higher 
fraction of the incremental dollar of payout goes toward share repurchases when investors 
value share repurchases more than dividend payments. This notion of dividing the total 
payout with an eye toward the difference premium further supports catering-based 
substitution between dividends and share repurchases. 
3.6 Market reaction to substitution in line with catering incentives 
Presumably, managers cater to the investor demand for a particular payout in an 
effort to capture the valuation premium. A related question that remains unanswered is 
how investors perceive the managerial action of catering. All else equal, if managers 
rationally cater to appease the investor demand for a specific payout, any substitution in 
line with catering should be viewed more favorably by investors. Specifically, if the 
catering view holds, it is likely that the stock market reaction to announcements leading 
to dividend decreases would be significantly less negative when firms decrease dividends 
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and repurchase shares in response to catering incentives. If substitution is not driven by 
catering, then the market reaction to dividend decreases and share repurchases would not 
be driven by the difference premium. 
As Grullon and Michaely (2002) point out, testing such a hypothesis is not 
simple. It is rare for firms to simultaneously announce a share repurchase and a dividend 
reduction because it could signal to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that the 
announced repurchase is a perfect substitute for a dividend cut. As a way to get around 
this problem, Grullon and Michaely look at announcements of dividend decreases and see 
how the prior share-repurchasing activity of firms explains the market response to such 
announcements. Research shows that stock market reaction to dividend decreases is 
largely negative and to dividend increases is largely positive (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 
1986; Healy and Palepu, 1988). However, in line with substitution hypothesis, Grullon 
and Michaely find that the market reaction to announcements of dividend decreases are 
less negative when such announcements are made by share-repurchasing firms. I augment 
the Grullon and Michaely approach by examining dividend changes—increases as well as 
decreases—to see how the market reacts to substitution in the face of changing catering 
incentives. Intuition suggests that investors will greet firms more favorably when they 
follow investors’ wishes (and cater to their demand for a specific payout) and less 
favorably when firms do not. 
To test this, I collect a sample of all announcements of changes in cash dividends 
between 1972 and 2010, from the CRSP database. We know (e.g., Brav et al., 2005) that 
investors view large dividend changes (decreases as well as increases) as very strong 
signals. Because dividends and repurchases are not perfect substitutes (e.g., Lee and Rui, 
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2007), it is unlikely that the market reaction to large decreases (increases) in dividends 
will be anything but negative (positive). Expecting the predictably strong reaction at the 
extremes, I turn to smaller changes in dividends. I look at announcements of changes in 
quarterly cash dividends that resulted in a dividend reduction or increase between 5 and 
25%. For this sample of firms, I calculate the three-day cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR), using the event-time window of -1 to +1 trading days around the announcement 
of the dividend change. CARs are calculated using the standard event-study methodology 
(e.g., Brown and Warner, 1980). The parameters of the market model are estimated over 
255 trading days, ending 46 days prior to the announcement, using the CRSP value-
weighted index as the market portfolio and requiring a minimum of 100 trading days over 
the estimation window. 
I separate the announcements of dividend changes into two bins: one containing 
the announcements that led to increases in dividends and the other containing the 
announcements that led to decreases in dividends. I match the changes in dividends to the 
repurchasing activity of the firm. I also measure the change in the difference premium 
leading up to the announcement of the dividend change. Then, I classify the results based 
on how the market reacts to two predictions of the catering hypothesis. I look at a case 
where the catering hypothesis predicts a move toward dividends and away from 
repurchases (i.e., the difference premium decreases) and another where the catering 
hypothesis predicts a move toward repurchases and away from dividends (i.e., the 
difference premium increases). My results support the idea that the market rewards firms 
that consider investor demand for a specific type of payout.  
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Table 6 shows the mean and median CARs around announcements of dividend 
changes (between 5 and 25% of the previous year’s dividend) by firms in the CRSP 
database between 1972 and 2010. The left panel includes announcements of dividend 
increases when the difference premium decreased. If the catering hypothesis holds, a 
decrease in the difference premium suggests that firms should increase dividends and 
move away from repurchases. Within this group, I examine how the repurchasing activity 
of the firms during the prior fiscal year changes the market response. Separating firms on 
repurchasing activity makes it easier to examine the Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
substitution relative to the catering hypothesis. For the cases when the difference 
premium decreased, the announcement of a dividend increase by non-repurchasing firms 
is greeted with a statistically significant average CAR of 1.052%. In the same situation, 
firms that did not follow the catering prescription and repurchased shares before 
announcing dividend increases see a positive but lower CAR of 0.893%. The difference 
in market reaction between the repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms in this group is 
negative and significant. This supports the prediction of the catering hypothesis that 
investors greet firms more favorably when they pay attention to investor demands. 
The right panel of Table 6 includes firms that announced reductions in dividend 
payments when the difference premium increased. Catering hypothesis predicts that 
increases in the difference premium will be met with more repurchases and decreases in 
dividend payments. I find that announcements of dividend decreases by repurchasing 
firms under this situation are met with a negative but statistically insignificant CAR (-
0.103%). In the same situation, announcements of dividend decreases by non-
repurchasing firms see a more negative (-0.705%) and statistically significant CAR. On 
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average, announcements of dividend decreases in line with catering predictions result in a 
statistically significant difference of 0.602% in CAR. I find similar results when 
comparing the median CARs. 
To further control for other factors that could affect the market reaction to 
dividend changes, I repeat the tests in a multivariate setting. Table 7 shows the results of 
these tests. I use Change percent—the absolute value of the announced percentage change 
in dividend—as a control for the size of the dividend change. Consistent with 
substitution, I find that the announcements of dividend decreases are met with more 
favorable CARs when the firm also repurchases shares. When I add the lagged value of 
the difference premium to the regression (specification 3), I find a positive and significant 
coefficient on the difference premium variable. This indicates that the market reaction to 
a dividend decrease is more positive when the difference premium is positive. The market 
reaction to dividend increases indicates that the CARs are higher when the firm did not 
repurchase shares and also when the difference premium is negative. These results further 
support the catering hypothesis and show that catering plays a role in the substitution 
between dividends and repurchases. Investors react more favorably to announcements of 
dividend changes when these announcements are in line with the predictions of the 
catering hypothesis. 
Overall, the univariate and multivariate results for announcements of changes in 
dividends show that the market reacts positively to dividend increases and negatively to 
dividend decreases. Clearly, there is more to the announcement of dividend changes than 
catering alone. However, within this framework, investors react more favorably when the 
firms act in line with the predictions of the catering hypothesis. When the difference 
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premium is negative and firms announce a decrease in dividends and repurchase shares, 
investors react less unfavorably. 
4. Conclusion 
 
Catering hypothesis posits that managers rationally cater to investor demand. 
When applied more specifically to payout policy, this hypothesis predicts that managers 
are more likely to repurchase shares when the premium investors place on shares of 
repurchasing firms is higher than the premium they place on shares of dividend-paying 
firms. I propose a proxy for measuring the attractiveness of repurchases—the repurchase 
premium. I relate this to the dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) and also 
propose a proxy to measure the attractiveness of repurchases over dividends—the 
difference premium. Using data from 1971–2010, I find that firms are more likely to 
repurchase shares (pay dividends) when the lagged value of the difference premium is 
positive (negative). Results support the catering hypothesis after controlling for firm 
characteristics, the differences in tax rates between income and capital gains, measures of 
firm-level risk, unobserved firm fixed effects, the 1982 SEC rule change that made 
repurchases more attractive, and the recent financial crisis.  
A contemporaneous study by Jiang et al. (2012) finds that firms are more likely to 
initiate and continue share repurchases when investors value firms that frequently 
repurchase shares more than those that do not. Jiang et al. also find that the fraction of 
shares repurchased increases with their repurchase premium and decreases with the Baker 
and Wurgler dividend premium. I find that the difference premium can explain the 
propensity to repurchase shares, after controlling for the time-varying firm characteristics 
studied by Fama and French (2001) and the risk variables studied by Hoberg and 
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Prabhala (2009). The difference premium can also explain the repurchasing activity of 
dividend-paying firms. I find catering incentives to be related to deviations from the 
predicted payout behavior of firms (modeled using the Lintner (1956) approach). 
Evidence suggests that firms deviate from the predicted dividend payment and repurchase 
more shares when the difference premium is positive. My results also indicate that firms 
channel a higher fraction of the additional payout dollars toward share repurchases when 
the difference premium is positive. These results together support the role of catering in 
the well-documented substitution of repurchases for dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 
2002). 
Investors react positively to the news of dividend increases and negatively to the 
news of dividend decreases, irrespective of the firm’s share-repurchasing activity. This 
fact underlines that dividends and repurchases are not perfect substitutes. However, 
investors treat dividend decreases by repurchasing firms more favorably when managers 
pay attention to the investor demand for repurchases. Overall, my results show that the 
decision to repurchase shares or to pay dividends is driven by the relative magnitude of 
the dividend and repurchase premiums. This relative attractiveness of dividends and 
repurchases indicates a role for catering in explaining the substitution between 
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Figures and Tables: 
Figure 1: Payout Premiums and the Difference Premium 
This figure shows the yearly values of the premiums from 1971 to 2010. Repurchasers are firms that have 
repurchased shares (as indicated by Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock (Compustat data PRSTKC) 
after adjustments to the decrease in Preferred Stock Redemption Value (PSTKRV) from the year before) 
worth more than 1% of their market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated as the per-share 
price at the end of the calendar year (PRCC_C) times shares outstanding (CSHO). Non-repurchasers are 
firms in the sample that are not classified as Repurchasers. Repurchase Premium is the natural logarithm 
of the value-weighted market-to-book (M/B) ratio for repurchasers minus the natural logarithm of the 
value-weighted M/B for non-repurchasers. Book-value of assets (AT) is used as the weight in calculating 
the value-weighted measures. M/B is defined as in Fama and French (2001). Dividend Premium is the 
value-weighted dividend premium (as defined in Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). Data for the dividend 
premium until 2000 are as given in the Baker and Wurgler study, and data from 2001–2010 are calculated 
using the method described therein. Difference Premium is defined as the repurchase premium minus the 
dividend premium. The dotted line, the dashed line, and the solid line show the Repurchase Premium, the 










Table 1: Yearly value of the premiums 
This table shows the yearly values of the Repurchase Premium, the Dividend Premium, and the 




 Repurchase  Dividend Difference 
Premium Premium Premium 
1971 -0.193 0.182 -0.375 
1972 -0.174 0.266 -0.440 
1973 -0.209 0.259 -0.468 
1974 -0.079 0.132 -0.211 
1975 -0.202 0.156 -0.358 
1976 0.184 0.156 0.028 
1977 0.016 0.046 -0.030 
1978 0.182 -0.050 0.232 
1979 0.162 -0.143 0.305 
1980 0.137 -0.221 0.358 
1981 0.000 -0.249 0.249 
1982 -0.163 -0.169 0.006 
1983 -0.120 -0.262 0.142 
1984 -0.013 -0.125 0.112 
1985 0.039 -0.110 0.149 
1986 0.038 -0.073 0.111 
1987 -0.071 -0.078 0.007 
1988 -0.014 -0.078 0.064 
1989 -0.035 -0.087 0.052 
1990 0.116 -0.010 0.126 
1991 0.195 -0.046 0.241 
1992 0.116 -0.053 0.169 
1993 0.147 -0.115 0.262 
1994 0.135 -0.075 0.210 
1995 0.198 -0.151 0.349 
1996 0.170 -0.094 0.264 
1997 0.147 -0.048 0.195 
1998 0.083 0.014 0.069 
1999 -0.105 -0.332 0.227 
2000 -0.060 -0.206 0.146 
2001 0.231 0.024 0.207 
2002 0.204 0.032 0.171 
2003 0.311 -0.012 0.323 
2004 0.158 -0.029 0.187 
2005 0.067 -0.178 0.245 
2006 0.040 -0.114 0.154 
2007 -0.166 -0.095 -0.071 
2008 0.184 0.014 0.170 
2009 0.275 0.004 0.271 
2010 0.161 -0.052 0.213 
Mean 0.052 -0.049 0.102 




Table 2: Logit Regression on decision to pay dividends/repurchase shares 
This table shows results of logit regressions to model the choice to repurchase shares and to pay dividends. 
The dependent variable Repurchaser takes a value of 1 if the firm is classified as a repurchaser for a 
particular year and zero otherwise. The dependent variable Dividend Payer takes a value of 1 if the firm is 
classified as a dividend payer in a particular year and zero otherwise. Repurchase Yield and Dividend Yield 
are the dollar amounts spent on repurchases and dividends, respectively, scaled by the market value of 
equity. Dollar amounts spent on repurchases are calculated using Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock 
(Compustat data PRSTKC) after adjusting for the decrease in Preferred Stock Redemption Value (PSTKRV) 
from the year before. Dollar amounts spent on dividends are calculated using the value of common 
dividends (DVC). A firm is classified as a dividend payer if the dollar amount spent on dividends is 
positive. The Repurchaser classification and the Difference Premium are as defined in Table 1. LnAssets is 
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (AT). Debt is the value of long-term debt (DLTT), 
scaled by total assets. Cash is the value of cash and cash equivalents (CHE) held by a firm, scaled by total 
assets. FCF is the free cash flow, defined as the gross operating income (OIBDP) minus the sum of 
depreciation (DP), tax payments (TXT), interest expenses (XINT), and dividends (sum of DVP and DVC) 
scaled by total assets. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as the value of the operating income of the 
firm (OIBDP) scaled by total assets. Std. Dev. FCF is the standard deviation in the FCF value over the last 
three years. Return is the return on the stock price of the firm in the fiscal year. M/B is the market-to-book 
ratio measured as in Fama and French (2001). NYP is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) market 
capitalization percentile, i.e., the fraction of NYSE firms having equal or smaller capitalization. 
Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of the firm’s daily excess stock 
returns (raw returns less the risk-free rate) on the market factor (i.e., the value-weighted market return from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) less the riskfree rate). Systematic Risk is the standard 
deviation of the predicted value from the idiosyncratic risk calculation. NYP, Systematic and Idiosyncratic 
risk variables are as defined in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Tax is the difference between the highest 
prevalent rate in income tax over capital gains tax. All independent variables are calculated at the end of the 
prior fiscal year (and hence represented with a subscript of t-1). Time periods for samples used in the 
individual specifications are as mentioned. Specifications 1 through 4 show results of logit regressions. 
Specification 5 shows results of a logit regression with firm fixed effects. Reported p-values are based on 
robust standard errors (also clustered by firm for specifications 1 through 4). ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  









Payer Repurchaser Repurchaser Repurchaser Repurchaser 
 
1972-2010 1972-2010 1983-2010 1972-2006 1972-2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Repurchase Yieldt-1 -1.015 25.267*** 23.097*** 28.292*** 6.344*** 
 
(0.173) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend Yieldt-1 17.723*** -0.144*** -0.059* -0.139*** -0.116*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.002) 
LnAssetst-1 0.005 0.001 -0.086*** -0.026* 0.573*** 
 
(0.839) (0.939) (0.000) (0.099) (0.000) 
Debt t-1 -0.424*** -0.134 -0.172* -0.085 -1.799*** 
 
(0.006) (0.139) (0.080) (0.365) (0.000) 
Casht-1 -0.031 0.835*** 0.779*** 0.808*** 1.457*** 
 
(0.856) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FCFt-1 4.223*** -0.553** -0.536** -0.633*** -0.083 
 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.034) (0.004) (0.768) 
ROAt-1 2.637*** 3.182*** 3.208*** 3.273*** 1.768*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Std. dev FCFt-1 -10.932*** -0.734*** -0.940*** -0.845*** -0.827*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Returnt-1 0.037*** -0.035*** -0.024** -0.034*** -0.035*** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.025) (0.005) (0.001) 
M/Bt-1 -0.206*** -0.064*** -0.109*** -0.068*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
NYPt-1 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.355) 
Idiosyncratic Riskt-1 -24.110*** -7.446*** -7.282*** -6.906*** -2.514*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Systematic Riskt-1 -27.921*** 6.681*** 10.133*** 1.384 8.177*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.551) (0.000) 
Taxt-1 1.366*** -0.804*** 0.931*** -0.806*** -0.072 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.537) 
Difference Premiumt-1 -1.403*** 0.592*** 0.723*** 0.642*** 0.218*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Constant -1.150*** -1.413*** -1.376*** -1.371*** - 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Firm Fixed Effects No No No No Yes 
Observations 85,678 85,678 62,351 80,683  54,678  





Table 3: Propensity to repurchase  
This table shows results for the second of a two-stage regression of repurchasing activity on firm 
characteristics and the premiums. The sample period is from 1972 to 2010. The first stage is a set of Fama-
MacBeth logit regressions modeling the decision to repurchase shares using firm characteristics as controls, 
per the following equation:    
 
 
where NYP is the NYSE market capitalization percentile. M/B is measured as in Fama and French (2001). 
Growth in book assets (dA/A) is calculated as the change in asset size between year t-1 and t, scaled by 
assets. Profitability (E/A) is the earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data IB) plus interest 
expenses (XINT) plus income statement deferred taxes (TXDI) divided by book assets. Yearly values of 
coefficients and the explanatory variables are used to predict the probability of repurchasing shares. The 
error term u is the prediction error (actual policy minus predicted policy) or the residual propensity to 
repurchase shares for a given firm in the year. The residual uit are summed by year, and then divided by the 
number of firms in the sample for that year t to get the average annual prediction errors or the “propensity 
to repurchase.” 
In the second stage, the average annual “propensity to repurchase” (PTR) is regressed on the relevant 
premium: 
 
 ; where  
 
Pt-1 represents the one-year lagged value of the premium variable listed in the (second-stage) result. 
Running the first-stage regression with “Fama-French” controls implies running the first-stage Fama-
MacBeth regressions using the four variables shown above, (i.e., NYP, M/B, dA/A, and E/A) as controls. 
Running the first-stage regression with “Fama-French + Risk” controls implies running the first-stage 
Fama-MacBeth regressions using Idiosyncratic Risk, Systematic Risk, and the four variables (i.e., 
Systematic Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk, NYP, M/B, dA/A and E/A) as controls. Systematic Risk and 
Idiosyncratic Risk are as described in Table 2. Dividend Premium and Difference Premium variables are as 
described in Table 1. 
 
Panel A shows results when the first-stage regression is run using all sample firms between 1972 and 2010. 
Panel B shows the results when the sample is restricted to the dividend-paying firms in the same time 
period. For this, the first-stage regression is run for the choice to repurchase shares (but now only for 
dividend-paying firms). The second stage remains the same. Reported p-values are based on robust 





Panel A. All firms in sample 
    First stage independent variables: Fama-French Fama-French +  Risk 
 
        
Second stage dependent variable: PTR 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Difference Premiumt-1 0.111**   0.110** 
 
 
(0.040)   (0.049) 











  Observations 38 38 38 38 
R-Squared 0.112 0.088 0.103 0.080 
     Panel B. Dividend-paying firms 
  First stage independent variables: Fama-French Fama-French +  Risk 
 
        
Second stage dependent variable: PTR 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
  
  Difference Premiumt-1 0.186**   0.179** 
 
 
(0.019)   (0.024) 











  Observations 38 38 38 38 
R-Squared 0.144 0.062 0.133 0.058 




Table 4: Lintner model residual dividend error 
This table shows results of regressions explaining deviation from predicted dividend payment behavior. 
The dependent variable is the residual dividend error (Error), calculated following the Lintner (1956) 




For a firm i in year t, DIV is the dividend (Compustat data DVC), ΔDIV is the actual change in dividends in 
year t, EARN is the earnings before extraordinary items (IB), and MV is the market value of equity 
(calculated as PRCC_C times CSHO). β1,i,  β2,i , and β3,i are the model parameters estimated for each firm i 
over the period 1971–1990. These parameters are used to find the predicted change in dividends and then 
compared to the actual change to get the Error, using the equation above, for the period 1991–2010. To be 
included in the sample, firms must have paid dividends in at least 20 years and repurchased shares in 20 
years (not necessarily both in the same year) over the period 1971–2010. Non-operating Income is the non-
operating income before depreciation (NOPI) scaled by total assets. LnMVE is the natural logarithm of the 
MV. Difference Premium, Repurchase Yield, Debt, ROA, NYP, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Systematic Risk are 
as described in Tables 1 and 2. Std. dev ROA is the standard deviation of ROA, calculated using the last 
three years. All independent variables are calculated at end of fiscal year t-1. All specifications use dummy 
variables to control for the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries. Reported p-values are based on robust 




Dependent Variable: Error 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Repurchase Yieldt-1 -0.021** -0.019* -0.021** 
 
(0.038) (0.052) (0.033) 
Debtt-1 -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* 
 
(0.027) (0.083) (0.077) 
Non-operating Incomet-1 0.006 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.252) (0.748) (0.807) 
Std. dev ROAt-1 -0.005 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.570) (0.911) (0.929) 
ROAt-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.337) (0.185) (0.165) 
LnMVEt-1 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 



















   
(0.086) 
Constant -0.001* 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.052) (0.475) (0.331) 
Observations 3,585 3,561 3,561 




Table 5: Changes in total payout and repurchases 
This table shows the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and tobit regressions explaining the fraction of 
the additional total payout of firms that is used for repurchasing shares. The dependent variable is the 
change in the dollar amount of repurchases divided by the change in total payout, between year t-1 and year 
t. Total payout is defined as the sum of share repurchases and dividends. Specifications 1 and 2 show 
results for the OLS regressions using data from 1972–2010 and from 1983–2010, respectively. 
Specification 3 shows results for a tobit regression using data from 1972–2010. ΔROA is the one-year 
change in ROA. All other variables are as described in Tables 1 and 2. All specifications use dummy 
variables to control for the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries. Reported p-values are based on robust 
standard errors (also clustered by firm for specifications 1 and 2). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: ΔRepurchase/(Δ Total Payout) 
 
OLS OLS Tobit 
 
1972-2010 1983-2010 1972-2010  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Taxt-1 -0.617*** -0.112** -0.592*** 
 
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
LnAssetst-1 0.032*** 0.007 0.033*** 
 
(0.000) (0.261) (0.000) 
Debt t-1 -0.024 -0.016 -0.021 
 
(0.422) (0.630) (0.308) 
Casht-1 0.120*** 0.074** 0.080*** 
 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
FCFt-1 0.942*** 0.843*** 0.661*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAt-1 -0.749*** -0.663*** -0.523*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Std. dev FCFt-1 0.696*** 0.590*** 0.410*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Returnt-1 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 
 
(0.804) (0.367) (0.810) 
M/Bt-1 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
NYPt-1 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Idiosyncratic Riskt-1 2.543*** 1.810*** 1.524*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Systematic Riskt-1 5.507*** 6.545*** 4.721*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔROA -0.020 -0.052* -0.043 
 
(0.504) (0.074) (0.134) 
Difference Premiumt-1 0.192*** 0.199*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.477*** 0.574*** 0.734*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 59,913 42,144 59,913 
Adj R-Squared 0.084 0.060 0.048 
47 
 
    Table 6: Market Reaction to dividend changes 
This table shows the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for announcements of a change in the 
level of regular quarterly cash dividend paid by firms under certain situations. CARs are calculated using a 
market model return in which parameters are estimated using a 255-trading-day window, ending 46 days 
prior to the change in dividend announcement and requiring at least 100 observations. Center for Research 
in Securities Prices (CRSP) value-weighted portfolio is used as the benchmark for market returns. 
Difference Premium is as described in Table 1. Announcements of changes in the regular cash dividend to 
be paid to common shareholders are obtained from the CRSP database for the period of 1972–2010. 
Changes in dividend announcements are put into two groups. First group includes those where the 
announcement leads to an increase in dividends (between 5 and 25% of the last dividend) when the 
difference premium decreased. These are in the left panel. The second group includes the announcements 
leading to reductions in dividends (between 5 and 25% of the last dividend) when the difference premium 
increased. These are in the right panel. These groups are created to see how the market reaction lines up 
with the action suggested by the catering hypothesis. The Repurchaser column refers to firms within a 
group that have repurchased shares worth more than 1% of the market value of equity within one fiscal 
year prior to the announcement of the dividend change. Non-repurchaser refers to firms that do not meet 
the repurchaser criterion. Difference shows the difference in CARs between the Repurchaser and the Non-
repurchaser category within the group. Means and medians of the CAR are shown. Significance levels of 
means (medians) are tested to see if they are significantly different from zero using a two-tailed t-test 
(Wilcoxon Rank-sum test). Then the difference between the means (medians) is tested using a two-tailed t-





Dividend increase anouncements Dividend decrease announcements 
 
when Difference Premium decreased when Difference Premium increased 
   
  
   
 
Repurchaser Non-repurchaser Difference Repurchaser Non-repurchaser Difference 
Mean 0.893*** 1.052*** -0.159* -0.103 -0.705*** 0.602** 
   
  
   Median 0.723*** 0.796*** -0.074* 0.238* -0.214*** 0.452** 
   
  




Table 7: Multivariate tests on market response to dividend changes 
This table shows results of regressions explaining the market reaction to announcements of dividend 
changes. Announcements of changes in the regular cash dividend to be paid to common shareholders are 
obtained from the CRSP database for the period 1972–2010. The dependent variable is CAR, as described 
in Table 6. The first three specifications include announcements that led to a decrease in the regular cash 
dividend to be paid to common shareholders. Specifications 4–6 include announcements that led to an 
increase in the cash dividend amount to be paid to common shareholders. To be included in the sample, the 
dividend changes have to be between 5 and 25%, relative to the previous dividend. Change Percent is the 
absolute value of the percentage change in the dividend. All other variables are as described in Tables 1, 2, 
4, and 5. Following Grullon and Michaely (2002), ROA has been truncated at the first and the 99
th
 
percentiles, and Dividend Yield has been truncated at the 99
th
 percentile. Reported p-values are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: CAR 
 
Dividend decrease Dividend increase 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Repurchasert-1 0.007** 0.005 0.004 -0.001* -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.034) (0.146) (0.194) (0.084) (0.794) (0.706) 
Change Percent 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.036* 0.037** 0.039** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.051) (0.039) (0.034) 
LnAssetst-1 0.002* -0.002 -0.003* -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 
(0.081) (0.141) (0.074) (0.000) (0.007) (0.178) 
Dividend Yieldt-1 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.921) (0.735) (0.881) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔROA 0.044** 0.033 0.030 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
 





































Constant 0.006 0.018 0.010 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.014** 
 
(0.479) (0.105) (0.364) (0.000) (0.004) (0.011) 
Observations 1,947 1,947 1,947 5,816 5,816 5,816 
Adj R-Squared 0.026 0.040 0.053 0.015 0.016 0.019 
 
 
 
 
